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This is a two-part comment written by two authors illustrating
the problems faced by Montana workers in obtaining compensa-
tion for work-related injury or disease. Montana's coverage for
compensation is legislatively divided into two separate areas.
Work-related injuries are compensated under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act, and work-related diseases are compensated under
the Occupational Disease Act. The problems in each area are simi-
lar and often overlap. Both authors suggest legislative revisions.
I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Introduction
Workers' compensation laws provide benefits to workers dis-
abled by work-related injuries. The laws seek to treat injuries inci-
dental to the employment as a cost of operating a business. The
cost of the compensation, although originally borne by the em-
ployer, is ultimately passed on to the consumer in the cost of the
1
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product. Under the workers' compensation scheme the employee
relinquishes his common law right to sue the employer for damages
in return for benefits awarded without regard to fault.1
Workers' compensation does not purport to include within its
scope all the health problems suffered by an employee that happen
to make an untimely appearance during working hours. To qualify
for workers' compensation the worker must (1) suffer a compensa-
ble injury under the Workers' Compensation Act and (2) establish
a causal relationship between the employment and the injury."
These two requirements, while easily stated, do pose certain
problems which will be examined separately.
1. Determining a Compensable Injury
Traditionally, a compensable injury has included an element
of "accident." s The usual statutory phrase embodying this require-
ment is "personal injury by accident." 4 Several states that do not
include this term expressly in their statutes read the requirement
into the recovery formula by way of judicial interpretation.5 A sec-
ond related component adopted by most states mandates that the
1. 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10, at 2 (Supp. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON].
2. E.g., Stamatis v. Betchel Power Corp. and Industrial Indemnity Co., - Mont.
__ 601 P.2d 403 (1979); Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Construction Co., __ Mont. -, 598
P.2d 1099 (1979).
3. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-102(14)(a) (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Cum.
Supp. 1979); MISs. CODE ANN. § 71-3-3(b) (1972). Ten states do not require that the injury
be accidental in nature. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (Wast Supp. 1980) ("injury arising out of
and in the course of employment"); IOWA CODE § 85.3(1) (1979) ("personal injuries arising
out of and in course of employment"); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.620(1) (Supp. 1978) ("injury"
means "work-related change in human organism"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39 § 51 (1964)
("personal injury to, or death of employee by an injury in course of employment; connected
therewith, and referable thereto"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-1 (1979) ("personal injury arising
out of and in course of employment"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-1-1(2) (1978) ("injury
arising out of and in course of employment"); Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-102(a)(xii) (1977) "in-
jury" means "harmful change in human organism other than normal aging and including
death, arising out of and in course of employment").
4. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:15-1 (1937);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-45 (1953). In addition to the common phrase, other phrases which
have been used are "accidental injury" and "injury by an accident." See IDAHO CODE § 72-
102(14)(a) (Supp. 1979) ("injury" means "personal injury caused by accident"); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 71-3-3(b) (1972) ("injury" means "accidental injury or death"); cf. Longshoremen's &
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1976) (defining "injury" as "acci-
dental injury or death"). The Washington statute refers to injuries of a "traumatic nature."
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (1978) ("injury" means "sudden and tangible happening of
traumatic nature, producing immediate and prompt result").
5. E.g., Shapaka v. State Compensation Comm'r, 146 W.Va. 319, 119 S.E.2d 821
(1961).
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injury be assignable to a definite time and place.6
The accident and time and place requirements have posed
perplexing problems. An early English case, Fenton v. Thorley &
Company,7 concluded that the word "accident" denoted "an un-
looked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or
designed." Since most states adopted this definition when inter-
preting their own statutes, the basic and indispensable ingredient
of "accident" became "unexpectedness." The problem then be-
came whether it was the cause of the injury or the resulting injury
itself that was to be accidental or unexpected.
Two distinct lines of authority developed concerning whether
the cause or result had to be accidental. These divisions will be
referred to as "accidental cause" jurisdictions and "accidental re-
sult" jurisdictions. States that insisted that the accidental nature
of the injury be found in the cause formed a restrictive view of
what constitutes an injury. In order to satisfy the time and place
requirement in an accidental cause jurisdiction, the cause rather
than the result must be of a definite time and place as well as be
accidental or unexpected. Therefore, an injury occasioned by a
gradually developing condition such as a series of stresses and ex-
ertions was excluded from coverage since the specific time of the
cause of injury could not be determined.'0 On the other hand, this
kind of injury would be compensable in an accidental result juris-
diction because the result can be assigned to a specific time and
place." Thus, an accidental result jurisdiction is more liberal in
the award of workers' compensation benefits.
Authur Larson, renowned for his study of workers' compensa-
tion laws, attributes the development of the accidental-cause/acci-
dental-result distinction to the subtle conversion of the phrase
6. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 37.20, at 7-5; e.g., Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972); cf. IDAHO CODE § 72-102(14)(b) (Supp. 1979) ("accident"
means "mishap or event which can be reasonably located as to time and place of
occurrence").
7. [19031 A.C. 443.
8. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 37.20, at 7-4.
9. Id. at 7-6.
10. See Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972) (heart
attack caused by four frustrating experiences over 19-day period not traceable to definite
time, place and cause). But cf. R. MacIntyre, Jr., Workmen's Compensation and Heart At-
tacks, 10 Hous. L. REv. 178, 183 (1972) (court should recognize that heart attack may result
from lengthy period of nervous strain).
11. See New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg, 119 N.H. 223, 226, 400 A.2d 1163,
1168-69 (1979) (heart attack caused by protracted work-related psychological stress can be
compensable; single sudden precipitating event not required); Bill Grover Ford Co. v. Ro-
niger, 426 P.2d 701, 702 (Okla. 1967) (accidental injury may arise from cumulative effect of
series of exertions; unnecessary for injury to be attributable to one event).
1982]
3
LaPlante and Opp: Workers’ Compensation
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1982
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
"personal injury by accident" into the phrase "personal injury by
an accident."" Once this element was read into the statute the
courts were in a position to set forth on an endless search for "the
accident" in situations where there did not happen to 'be some
overt mishap."3 Larson attributes this distortion to a desire to
build a retaining wall around liability in the more difficult and less
obvious injury cases." When one merely looks for an accidental
result there is nothing which seriously circumscribes liability, for
there are almost no injuries that are "expected." If the claimant
had expected an injury as a result of his action, he presumably
would have avoided the action.1 5
Another source of difficulty with the accidental cause require-
ment is the "unusual exertion" doctrine. Under this doctrine the
employee must prove an unusual exertion in the course of his em-
ployment which caused the injury.' It must be shown that the in-
jury resulted from an exertion or stress greater than the exertion
or stress required in the performance of his usual duties '17 A com-
mon example to illustrate this point is the case of a man who regu-
larly lifts 100-pound sacks. It is not an unusual exertion if he regu-
larly does this in his work; hence, there is no unexpected cause if
he suffers a heart attack while lifting a sack in the usual way. How-
ever, there is an unusual exertion if a worker lifts even a 25-pound
sack if his usual work requires no lifting at all. In such a case he is
eligible for compensation if he suffers an injury while doing so.18
The accidental cause requirement and the unusual exertion
doctrine serve to narrow workers' compensation coverage and pre-
12. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 37.20, at 7-6.
13. Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and Sug-
gested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REv. 441, 444 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Heart Cases].
14. Id. at 443.
15. Id.
16. See General Motors Corp. v. Veasey, 371 A.2d 1074 (Del. 1977) (worker with pre-
existing condition must be engaged in "unusual exertion" at time of injury for there to be an
accident); Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581, 588 (Fla. 1962) (heart injury
compensable only if worker subject to strain or overexertion not common in routine work);
Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 582, 227 A.2d 20, 25 (1967) (to be acci-
dental, injury must result from some unusual exertion or strain or some unusual condition
in employment).
17. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 38.64(a), at 7-182, -183; Note, Heart Injuries under
Workers' Compensation: Medical and Legal Considerations, 14 SUFFOLK UNiV. L. REv.
1363, 1383-84 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Heart Injuries].
18. Compare Clayton v. Lease Ways Trans. Co., 236 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1970) (unusual
exertion for driver of concrete mixer truck to pick up and throw aside plank weighing 50 to
70 pounds), with Bellamy v. Morace Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 327, 128 S.E.2d 395 (1962)
(not unusual exertion for stevedore and co-worker to move two pallets weighing 400 pounds
each and two nets weighing 500 pounds each).
[Vol. 43
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clude compensation for a large number of injuries.' 9 The accidental
cause requirement tends to obscure the goal of compensating an
employee for a work-related injury by requiring a search for an ac-
cident rather than focusing simply on work-relatedness. There is
nothing in the accidental injury concept that demands the acciden-
tal character to be found in the cause rather than the result.2 0 Fur-
thermore, the usual-unusual exertion distinction is unworkable be-
cause it is difficult to determine what is unusual in a given case.2
The doctrine may unfairly exclude one claim from coverage be-
cause the same quantum of stress and exertion may be unusual for
one worker, but not unusual for another.
A majority of states have now abandoned the unusual exertion
doctrine and find that the accidental requirement of an injury is
satisfied if either the cause or result is accidental.2 2 In these juris-
dictions, the injury itself satisfies the accident requirement. The
primary emphasis is not whether the injury occurred by accident
but whether the work caused the injury.'2 The Supreme Court in
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore24 discussed this fundamental
principle of the workers' compensation system: "The liability is
based, not upon the act or omission by the employer, but upon the
existence of a relationship which the employee bears to the em-
ployment because of and in the course of which he has been in-
jured."' Thus, once the accident requirement is disposed of, the
essence of the problem becomes causation, and the first task is to
plainly state a legal test of causation.
2. The Causal Relationship
The second element required by the workers' compensation
formula is a causal relationship between the injury and the em-
ployment. Most states have adopted the British Compensation Act
formula: injury "arising out of and in the course of employment.""
19. See 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 38.82, at 7-230, -231; Heart Injuries, supra note
17, at 1386-87.
20. 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 38.61, at 7-145; cf. Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa.
90, 96, 252 A.2d 601, 604 (1969) (erroneous assumption that accidental character of injury
must be found in cause).
21. See 1B LARSON, supra note 1, § 38.64(b), at 7-186. See also 1B LARSON, supra note
1, § 38.63, at 7-150.
22. Id. § 38.00, at 7-12; e.g., Jackson v. Emile J. Legere, Inc., 110 N.H. 252, 254, 265
A.2d 18, 20 (1970) ("unusual strain" not necessary for heart attack to be accidental because
statutory requirement need not be supplied by cause but may be fulfilled by effect).
23. E.g., Gartner v. Jackson's Inc., 95 R.I. 489, 495, 188 A.2d 85, 88 (1963).
24. 263 U.S. 418 (1924).
25. Id. at 423.
26. But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-45 (1953). Utah changed the wording of the stat-
1982]
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This phrase serves to measure the relationship between the injury
and the employment. To make the task of construction easier, the
phrase has been broken in half with the "arising out of employ-
ment" component relating to causal connection, and the "in the
course of employment" component concerning the time, place and
circumstances of the injury.27 The two components, however, work
together as a single test of work connection.2"
In applying the "arising out of the employment" component, it
is important to note that the employment is thought of more as a
condition out of which the injury arises than as the force producing
the injury.29 The phrase is seemingly not equivalent to "legally
caused by the employment." In fact, proximate cause or legal cause
analogies are out of place in the workers' compensation context. In
workers' compensation law the focus is not on some act which
causes an injury, but on the relation, condition, or situa-
tion-namely employment-which causes an injury.80 Proximate or
legal cause is also out of place in compensation law because it is a
concept permeated with the idea of fault. The concept of
foreseeability flows from the idea of fault and becomes the primary
-test to determine legal cause. Under the workers' compensation ra-
tionale, the criterion is work connection and not whether the em-
ployer foresaw particular kinds of harm or not. 1
The "in the course of the employment" component requires
that a compensable injury must not only arise within the time and
space limits of the employment, but also in the course of an activ-
ity related to the employment.32 An activity is related to employ-
ment if it carries out the employer's purposes or advances his in-
terests directly or indirectly."
The causal relationship of the injury to the employment is the
appropriate focal point for determining a compensable injury. The
Montana courts, however, demonstrate a lack of concentration on
this issue. Rather, efforts are focused on the first element of the
ute to "arising out of or in the course of employment." (Emphasis added).
27. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.10, at 3-2.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 6.60, at 3-6.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 3-7.
32. Id. § 20, at 5-1.
33. E.g., Bourn v. James, 191 Neb. 635, 216 N.W.2d 739 (1974) (clear benefit to em-
ployer in having ranch hand claimant stay on the premises; claimant was awarded compen-
sation for injuries he suffered in a nighttime fire in his trailer); Beam v. State Workmen's
Compensation Fund, 261 S.C. 327, 200 S.E.2d 83 (1973) (compensation awarded for teachers
killed in auto wreck while driving to a meeting; although attendance was not required it was
urged and expected).
[Vol. 43
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compensation formula: finding that the worker suffered an injury.
B. Montana
Workers' compensation laws in Montana have undergone a va-
riety of changes in the past few decades, especially in determining
what constitutes a compensable injury. The formal changes in the
law defining injury were initiated by the legislature. The court,
however, has also had a hand in formulating changes. Sometimes
the status of the law on injury has not been entirely clear, as Jus-
tice Sheehy noted in registering his dissent in Hoehne v. Granite
Lumber Company: "in determining what is an 'injury' under the
Workers' Compensation Act, this court has demonstrated a quixot-
ic ability to mount its horse and ride off in all directions. '34
The two basic requirements of an injury and a causal relation-
ship are set forth in provisions of the Montana Workers' Compen-
sation Act. An injury, under Montana law, requires a "tangible
happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, or un-
usual strain, resulting in either external or internal physical
harm."35 The employer is liable for payment of compensation if an
employee receives an injury "arising out of and in the course of his
employment."3 6 Prior to 1961, however, an "injury" was defined by
statute to refer "only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous
event, as distinguished from the contraction of a disease. 3 7 The
word "fortuitous" under the old definition was interpreted by the
Montana court as "happening by chance or accident; coming or oc-
curring unexpectedly or without known cause."38 Furthermore, in-
34. - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 863 (1980).
35. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 37-71-119 (1981) pro-
vides that 'injury' or 'injured' means:
(1) A tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, or un-
usual strain, resulting in either external or internal physical harm, and such physi-
cal condition as a result therefrom and excluding disease not traceable to injury,
except as provided in subsection 2 of this section.
(2) Cardiovascular or pulmonary or respiratory diseases contracted by a paid fire-
man employed by a municipality, village or fire district as a regular member of a
lawfully established fire department, which diseases are caused by over-exertion in
times of stress or danger in the course of his employment by proximate exposure
or by cumulative exposure over a period of four (4) years or more to heat, smoke,
chemical fumes, or other toxic gases.
36. MCA § 39-71-407 (1981) provides that:
every insurer is liable for the payment of compensation, in the manner and to the
extent hereinafter provided, to an employee of an employer it insures who receives
an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment or, in the case of his
death from such injury, to his beneficiaries, if any.
37. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 92-418.
38. Nicholson v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 79 Mont. 358, 374, 257 P. 270, 274 (1927).
1982]
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juries were held to be accidental or the result of fortuitous events
where either the cause or the result was unusual, unexpected or
undesigned.3  In Hines v. Industrial Accident Board,40 the court
awarded compensation to a widow whose husband died from polio
caused from exposure to sewer and garbage when he worked for
the city street department. The court interpreted the definition of
injury to include those instances where there is no accident in the
ordinary sense, like an act of violence whereby an employee is
struck by an object or injured by a fall.41
Because of these decisions, Montana was clearly an accidental
result jurisdiction, and, as exemplified by Murphy v. Anaconda
Co.,42 the court flatly rejected the unusual exertion doctrine. In
Murphy, the employee suffered a heart attack and died while on
the job. Compensation was awarded. The court first found that
"the fact that he may have been suffering from a pre-existing
weakness does not detract from the right to recover compensation
because the employer takes the employee as he is." 4 The court
went on to hold that:
An accidental injury arises out of the employment when the re-
quired exertion producing the injury is too great for the person
undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the con-
dition of his health, provided the exertion is either the sole or
contributing cause of the injury. In short, an injury is accidental
when either the cause or result is unexpected or accidental, al-
though the work being done is usual or ordinary.44
The Hines decision was handed down on the eve of the convo-
cation of the 1961 Legislative Assembly. Some commentators felt
that by the time Hines was decided the court had relegated the old
definition of injury to complete oblivion.45 During the 1961 session
the legislature amended the statute defining injury to specifically
limit Montana to the status of an accidental cause jurisdiction.
The amendment defined "injury" to mean: "a tangible happening
of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, resulting in ei-
ther external or internal physical harm.""' Three cases demon-
strate the hardships imposed by the 1961 amendment.
39. Rathbun v. Taber Tank Lines, Inc., 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955).
40. 138 Mont. 588, 358 P.2d 447 (1960).
41. Id. at 596, 358 P.2d at 451.
42. 133 Mont. 198, 321 P.2d 1094 (1958).
43. Id. at 207, 321 P.2d at 1099.
44. Id. at 209, 321 P.2d at 1100.
45. Lupien v. Montana Record Publishing Co., 143 Mont. 415, 418, 390 P.2d 455, 457
(1964).
46. R.C.M. 1947 § 92-418 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 43
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In Lupien v. Montana Record Publishing Co.,47 the claimant
was a mailer who had been on the same job for 27 years. One
morning, after reporting to work, he suffered a heart attack and
died. The district court found that Lupien had worked hard the
previous day and on the day of the heart attack. The supreme
court, however, held that even accepting the lower court's version
of the record, the "tangible happening of a traumatic nature from
an unexpected cause" was not present. The court stated: "Every-
thing done by Lupien was expected of him and by him. It was his
work to do just as he was doing and in varying degrees just as he
had been doing for some 27 years.""8 The court supported its deci-
sion denying compensation by pointing out that "the old phrase
'fortuitous event' included either (1) an unexpected cause or (2) an
unexpected result, whereas the new phrase is limited to a tangible
happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause."
49
As a consequence of the accidental cause requirement imposed
by the legislature, the court was forced to search for "an accident"
or find an "unusual exertion" to justify the new definition of in-
jury. This reflected an about-face from the holding enunciated in
Murphy and Hines. The emphasis shifted to finding an injury
rather than focusing on the more appropriate element of a causal
relationship between the injury and the employment.
Strain-type injuries, as well as heart injuries, posed a particu-
lar problem under the accidental cause requirement because the
activity causing the strain is rarely "unusual" or "unexpected."
This situation is illustrated in James v. V.K. V. Lumber Co.50 In
James, the claimant was employed as a lumber stacker. While at
work he bent over to pick up a block of wood weighing 10 to 15
pounds and in bending over felt a pain in his back. The next morn-
ing he was barely able to get out of bed. A doctor diagnosed the
injury as "lumbosacral strain." The claimant was disabled for ap-
proximately one month. When he sought compensation, however,
the court held that he had not suffered an injury as contemplated
by the statute, because lifting the wood block was expected of him
and performed routinely by him.5' Following the rationale of
Lupien, the court held that there was simply no "tangible happen-
ing of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause. '5 2
47. 143 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455 (1964).
48. Id. at 419-20, 390 P.2d at 458.
49. Id. at 418, 390 P.2d at 457.
50. 145 Mont. 466, 401 P.2d 282 (1965).
51. Id. at 469, 401 P.2d at 283.
52. Id.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
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A third case demonstrating the new burden placed upon a
claimant is Miller v. City of Billings." The claimant had been em-
ployed to operate a dozer covering garbage at a landfill dump. The
claimant was overcome by diesel fumes from equipment and smoke
from burning trash while working at the dump. Although.the court
ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, it
found that claimant's diagnosed condition of pulmonary fibrosis
fell outside the definition of injury as set out in the statute. The
court issued this appraisal of the consequences of the gassing: "in
the instant case claimant was doing his usual work in the expected
way at all times. His exposure to dust and smoke was a normal
incident of employment at the landfill dump."' 54 Furthermore,
since the condition developed over a long period of time rather
than being triggered by any single episode, the court rejected this
as an injury." In this instance the causal connection seemed plau-
sible, but the court was caught in the trap of looking for an unex-
pected cause to justify the finding of an injury.
After the decision in Lupien was announced, at least three
bills were placed before the legislature proposing changes in the
definition of injury formulated by the 1961 amendment." One bill
would have included "strains" in the definition,5 ' but this and the
other measures were killed. When the legislature convened in 1967,
it succeeded in amending the injury statute-this time inserting
the term "or unusual strain" after "an unexpected cause." This
language has served as the definition of injury to the present day.
The amendment apparently abolished the accidental cause re-
quirement for injuries arising from strains but preserved the re-
quirement for all other injuries.
One of the first cases involving a strain-type injury to come
before the court after 1967 was Jones v. Bair's Cafe.58 Claimant
Jones was on shift as a dishwasher when she picked up a tray of
dishes and suffered a back strain. The court found that the 1967
amendment was intended to cover just such a situation: "There
was no 'unexpected cause' but there was an 'unusual strain'; thus
the measure would seem to be the result of a tangible happening of
a traumatic nature which results in physical harm, be it a rupture,
a strain, or a sprain." 59
53. 171 Mont. 91, 555 P.2d 747 (1976).
54. Id. at 95, 555 P.2d at 449.
55. Id.
56. See Jones v. Bair's Cafe, 152 Mont. 13, 19, 445 P.2d 923, 926 (1968).
57. Id.
58. 152 Mont. 13, 445 P.2d 923 (1968).
59. Id. at 19, 445 P.2d at 926.
[Vol. 43
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A subsequent case, Robins v. Ogle," reinforced the concept
that a strain, to be a compensable injury, need not be unusual from
a standpoint of cause. In Robins, the claimant suffered a back
strain while performing her usual duties. The court stated:
While it may be arguable in the instant case whether the strain
was unusual from the standpoint of cause, it is clear that the ef-
fect here was unusual-herniation of an intervertebral disc result-
ing from picking up the bucket in the wrong manner and turning
to pick up the mop. An unusual result from a work-related strain
qualifies as an 'unusual strain.'61
Both Jones and Robins make it clear that the statute requires
a showing of some tangible happening of a traumatic nature in ad-
dition to the resulting strain before an injury arises. In these
cases, the court seems to require a specific happening or incident
that can be assigned to a specific time and place. This "tangible
happening," whether usual or unusual, must be deemed to have
caused the strain before there is an injury. The result of Montana's
independent requirement that a strain must result from a "tangi-
ble happening of a traumatic nature" is that a triple burden is
placed upon the claimant to prove a compensable injury. The
claimant must: (1) demonstrate a tangible happening of a trau-
matic nature, (2) show this to be the cause of the strain, and (3)
satisfy the causation element of the formula that the injury arose
out of and in the course of his employment."
The phrase "tangible happening" also seems to denote a single
episode that caused the strain, but the Montana court has not
been that strict in interpreting these words. In Love v. Ralph's
Food Store," the claimant suffered a back strain from continually
lifting heavy objects as part of her job as a meat wrapper. The
claimant could not relate her condition to any single incident or
specific happening. The court, however, managed to wade through
some confusing testimony to pluck out two dates where claimant
suffered muscle spasms while lifting a meat grinder and a 50-
pound casing respectively. This problem also arose in Hoehne v.
Granite Lumber Co.," where the claimant suffered numbness in
his hands from stacking lumber on a daily basis over a two and
one-half month period. The condition developed gradually, wors-
60. 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d at 692 (1971).
61. Id. at 333, 485 P.2d at 694 (emphasis added).
62. E.g., Love v. Ralph's Food Store, 163 Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598 (1973).
63. E.g., Hurliut v. Vollstedt Kerr Co., 167 Mont. 303, 538 P.2d 344 (1975).
64. 163 Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598 (1973).
65. __ Mont. -, 615 P.2d 863 (1980).
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ened over a period of time, and could not be attributed to a spe-
cific incident. Rather than strive to find Specific dates of incidents
causing the strain, the court relied upon the definition of "tangible -
happening" that had been developed in Erhart v. Great Western
Sugar Co." With regard to the requirement of a "tangible happen-
ing of a traumatic nature" the court stated:
A tangible happening must be a perceptible happening, Webster's
Third New International Dictionary. Some action or incident, or
chain of actions or incidents must be shown which may be per-
ceived as a contributing cause of the resulting injury.s
To an extent, the Montana court has been liberal in its interpreta-
tion of "tangible happening" with regard to strain injuries. How-
ever, these cases show that the court is still looking for something
perceptible from the record as the cause of the injury, rather than
allowing the injury itself to satisfy the requirement for an injury.
C. Heart Injuries
The adjudication of claims for heart injuries under workers'
compensation laws is especially difficult because of the progressive
nature of coronary heart disease and the ambiguous relationship of
emotional stress and physical exertion to the development and ag-
gravation of coronary heart disease." Medical uncertainty in this
area impedes the determination of a causal relationship between
employment and heart injury.
An estimated 30 million Americans suffer from cardiovasculardisease." Approximately 1.25 million heart attacks occur each
year.70 In 1975 cardiovascular disease accounted for 52.5 percent of
all deaths in the United States.7 1 Given the dominant position of
heart disease as a source of disability and death, the extent to
which workers' compensation assumes both medical and income
maintenance responsibility for the victims of heart disease has a
heavy bearing on the comprehensiveness, cost and ultimate direc-
tion of the system.72 Obviously, if the heart attack is a genuinely
work-related injury, to deny compensation benefits would be a
66. 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055 (1976).
67. - Mont. -, 615 P.2d at 865.
68. See Heart Cases, supra note 13, at 475; see also Heart Injuries, supra note 17, at
1365.
69. Levy, Prevalence: Epidemiology of Cardiovascular Disease, in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF
MEDICINE § 354.1, at 1059 (15th ed. 1979).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Heart Cases, supra note 13, at 441.
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gross violation of the legislative purpose and of workers' rights.7 1 It
is equally obvious that, under workers' compensation coverage,
compensation cannot be paid for every heart attack that occurs
during working hours.
In some jurisdictions the courts have shown an increased will-
ingness to treat heart attacks as work-related injuries under work-
ers' compensation laws.74 This broader concept of the relationship
between employment and heart injuries has developed for various
reasons: advancements in medical knowledge, the traditional policy
of liberally construing workers' compensation statutes in favor of
the worker, and possibly the realization that a disabled worker's
best hope for financial assistance is often workers' compensation
benefits.7 5 Other jurisdictions, however, have been less generous. A
desire to limit the number of compensable heart injuries has led
certain states to revive the "unusual exertion" doctrine as a re-
quired element of legal causation.7
Montana's workers' compensation laws have not readily ac-
comodated compensation for heart injuries. The necessity of pin-
pointing a "tangible happening of a traumatic nature" that caused
the heart attack has resulted in searching for some unusual exer-
tion or activity out of the ordinary. Case law has established that
the "tangible happening" that causes a heart attack need not be
unusual or unexpected, but it is obviously easier to establish causa-
tion by showing an unusual exertion. This is particularly true in
heart cases because of conflict among medical authorities as to the
role that emotional stress and physical exertion play in the aggra-
vation or acceleration of coronary heart disease. The following
cases demonstrate the difficulty in adjudicating claims for heart in-
juries in Montana.
In Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Co.," the claimant was the su-
perintendent of a lumber mill. It was company policy not to oper-
ate the mill when the temperature was too cold for men and ma-
73. Id.
74. Id. at 445.
75. Note, Cardiac Claims Under California's Workmen's Compensation Law, 21 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 745, 749 (1970) (employers allege that conflict in medical testimony invariably
resolved in favor of claimant because courts construe law liberally); Workmen's Compensa-
tion and Heart Attacks, 10 Hous. L. REV. 179, 179 (1972) (liberal approach towards recov-
ery results from difficulty in establishing causation and general desire by courts to allow
recovery).
76. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8)
(Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-603(b) (1977); see Nichols v. Kansas State Highway
Comm'n, 211 Kan. 919, 923, 508 P.2d 856, 860 (1973) (amendment enacted to limit coverage
in "heart cases").
77. 167 Mont. 303, 538 P.2d 344 (1975).
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chinery. During the winter of 1973, particularly cold weather
caused the mill to be shut down for more than a week. While the
temperature was still colder than the normal operating tempera-
ture, the owner of the mill ordered the claimant to contact employ-
ees of the mill and begin operation the next day. Shortly after he
got the mill operating, the claimant suffered a heart attack. The
court held:
Aside from the testimony that it was a few degrees colder than
normal starting temperature and the mill had not previously op-
erated in temperatures that cold, there was no testimony this im-
posed upon claimant any duty which was unusual in kind or
amount. The duties performed by claimant on the day before his
attack . . . were duties he had performed for the previous eight
years as plant superintendent. Simply opening a mill on a day
colder than customary, with no inordinate kind or amount of
work on his part, cannot be said to constitute 'a tangible happen-
ifig of a traumatic nature.'"8
Therefore, the court denied the claim for compensation because
there was no injury as determined by the statute. The stumbling
block in the claimant's case was that the doctor could not pinpoint
the cause of the claimant's heart attack.
Stamatis v. Betchel Power Corp.79 involved a claim brought
by a widow whose husband was employed as an electrician. The
decedent collapsed on the job and died of ,a heart attack. Conflict-
ing testimony was given as to the decedent's activity just before
the collapse. Medical testimony also conflicted at several points.
The court concluded that decedent had been cleaning light fixtures
prior to his collapse and that his activity was "not of a strenuous
physical nature, nor was it unusual, nor was the outside air tem-
perature a factor in precipitating his collapse."80 Consequently, the
court held that there was "simply no evidence in the record of any
real, perceptible, or identifiable incident, action, or happening of a
traumatic nature within the definition of injury in the Act.""s
One of the most recent cases in this line of heart injuries is
Moen v. Decker Coal Co. 82 This decision provides a thorough ex-
planation of the injury requirement applicable to both heart and
non-heart injuries. In this instance the employee was working over-
time steam cleaning various pieces of heavy equipment, a task not
78. Id. at 307, 538 P.2d at 346 (emphasis added).
79. __ Mont. -, 601 P.2d 403 (1979).
80. Id. at -, 601 P.2d at 406 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. - Mont. -, 604 P.2d 765 (1979).
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part of his usual job. He was also assigned to drain the cleaner and
store the hoses. Later in the day, after he had finished, he suffered
a heart attack and died. His widow filed a claim for compensation.
The court first determined that two elements from the injury stat-
ute must be met: "(1) There must be a tangible happening of a
traumatic nature, and (2) this must be shown to be the cause of
physical harm .... "3 In explaining the first element of the in-
jury formula the court stated:
A tangible happening must be a perceptible happening ....
Some action or incident, or chain of actions or incidents, must be
shown which may be perceived as a contributing cause of the re-
sulting injury. This court has found neuroses compensable, but a
tangible, real happening must be a cause of the condition. 84
Regarding the second element or the causal element of the injury
requirement the court stated:
The death must be proven to be the result of a tangible happen-
ing of a traumatic nature. The claimant bears the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that a tangible happening
of a traumatic nature proximately caused physical harm. . . and
must show more than the mere possibility that the happening
caused the harm. If the evidence indicates a worker suffered a
heart attack while at work, rather than as a result of work, no
injury occurred under the statute. 8
The court concluded that there was no injury because the claimant
totally failed to prove that her husband's death resulted from a
"tangible happening of a traumatic nature. '8 6 Rather, the evidence
supportive of a valid claim went to the collateral matter of aggra-
vation of the decedent's condition and did not form solid links of a
chain of events.87
The independent requirement of finding a tangible happening
of a traumatic nature diverts attention to a search for accidents
and incidents and away from the more appropriate issue of causa-
tion. This requirement also tends to revive the "unusual exertion"
doctrine in establishing the cause of an injury. The result is an
additional burden on the employee/claimant and narrower applica-
tion of workers' compensation benefits.
83. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 767 (citations omitted).
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
86. Id. at __, 604 P.2d at 768.
87. Id. at __, 604 P.2d at 767.
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D. A Suggested Solution
Some jurisdictions have adopted presumptions altering the
claimant's burden of proof. The broadest type of presumption em-
ployed is one which presumes that the claim made by the worker is
for a compensable injury.8 8 An opponent may rebut the presump-
tion by substantial evidence that the injury was unrelated to the
employment.89 The underlying policy for these provisions is that
doubt should be resolved in the employees' favor."0 The presump-
tion is especially strong in heart injury cases because of the uncer-
tainty concerning the causes of heart diseases.9 "
Such a presumption would ease the difficulty of establishing a
causal relationship between employment exertion or stress and in-
jury.9 2 In Montana it would serve to avoid the difficulties in pin-
pointing an injury. The requirement of showing a tangible happen-
ing of a traumatic nature which caused the injury would be
abolished. Rather, the injury itself would satisfy the injury element
of the formula and emphasis would shift to whether or not the em-
ployment caused the injury. The presumption could be rebutted by
substantial evidence that the work-related stress or exertion did
not contribute to the occurrence of the injury.
The medical relation of exertion and stress will have to be left
to doctors; meanwhile, the legal system must provide a workable
solution for compensating work-related injuries. An important fac-
tor to bear in mind is that the objective of workers' compensation
is to promote safety in the work place and to provide benefits to
workers disabled from work-related injuries.
88. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 20, 44
Stat. 1436 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1976)) (in proceeding for enforce-
ment of claim for compensation, statute presumes claim comes within provisions of chap-
ter); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-85(1) (1976) (presumed that claim is for a covered work
injury).
89. 33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-85(1) (1976).
90. See Wheatley v. Adler, 407 F.2d 307, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (presumption reflects
strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases); Akamine v. Hawaiian Packing &
Crating Co., 53 Hawaii 406, 490, 495 P.2d 1164, 1166 (1972) (humanitarian nature of statute
demands resolution of doubt in favor of claimant).
91. See Wheatley v. Adler, 407 F.2d 307, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (presumption that heart
attack within provisions of statute not rebutted; court noted that limited medical ability to
reconstruct why "something unexpectedly goes wrong with human frame" makes rebuttal
difficult).
92. Cf. Note, Workmen's Compensation-Diseases Arising Out of Employment-A
Problem of Proof, 2 PAc. L.J. 678, 696 (1971) (recommending enactment of a rebuttable
presumption extending to all employees that a work-related disease is covered by workers'
compensation); Heart Injuries, supra note 17, at 1399-1401.
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II. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
A. Introduction
The Occupational Disease Act of Montanas was hastily en-
acted in 1959 to provide compensation to disabled workers suffer-
ing from work-related diseases. As with workers' compensation,
employees relinquished their right to sue the employer for negli-
gence in return for speedy and fair compensation. Up to the pre-
sent time, however, employees with work-related diseases have yet
to receive their part of the bargain. Meritorious occupational dis-
ease claims are being denied or not even filed. It may be true that
employers and insurers have interests that need protection, but
this protection should not be granted to the detriment of workers
with genuine, meritorious claims.
Of the 34,736 injuries and diseases reported to the Montana
Workers' Compensation Division for fiscal year 1980, only 243 were
classified by the Division as diseases.' This statistic belies the
magnitude and severity of the occupational disease problem. Na-
tional statistical studies reveal an incidence of occupational disease
far exceeding that which Montana has reported. The most recent
national study, which was done by the U.S. Department of Labor,
indicates that by 1978 there were almost 2 million workers dis-
abled by occupational diseases. Approximately 700,000 were suffer-
ing from long-term total disability, and another 1.2 million were
partially disabled.' 5 Two older national studies indicate that there
may be as many as 100,000 deaths per year from occupationally
caused diseases" and an estimated 390,000 new cases of occupa-
tional disease each year.'
Extrapolating from these latter national studies, using the
proportion of Montana's population to the national population as a
base, in 1980 Montana should have reported an estimated 1,377
new cases of occupational disease rather than 243. 98 The discrep-
93. MCA §§ 39-72-101 through -714 (1981).
94. MONTANA DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION ANNUAL REPORT (1980).
95. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
(June 1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].
96. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (GPO 1972) 111,
quoted in Kutchins, The Most Exclusive Remedy is No Remedy at All: Worker's Compen-
sation Coverage for Occupational Diseases, 32 LAB. L.J. 212, 217 (April 1981).
97. Ashford, The Magnitude of the Occupational Health Problem, CONG. JOINT SUB-
COMM. ON LABOR, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS'
COMPENSATION TASK FORCE CONFERENCE ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES AND WORKERS' COMPEN-
SATION (GPO 1976) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
98. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, USA STATISTICS IN BRIEF, 1980, A
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT SUPPLEMENT (GPO 1981).
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ancy indicates that Montana's occupational disease compensation
system is not performing its original purpose. The second part of
this comment will discuss why, and will also propose some legisla-
tive solutions.
Prior to this discussion, however, it is necessary to scrutinize
the definition of disease. When the Montana legislature created
the occupational disease compensation system it created the sys-
tem on a mistaken assumption that there is a logical and rational
difference between disease and injury. The following material will
show that there is not, and that the first change which must be
made in the occupational disease compensation system is that the
definitions of disease and injury must be legislatively consolidated.
B. Consolidation
To demonstrate that the definitions of disease and injury
should be consolidated, it is necessary to show that disease and
injury are not mutually exclusive. Ever since the first workers'
compensation statutes were enacted at the turn of the century,
even before the term "occupational disease" was coined, courts and
administrative bodies have been troubled with the difference be-
tween disease and injury.9 To date, no one, including any dppel-
late judge, legislator, lawyer or physician, has been able to define
satisfactorily disease to the exclusion of injury. The opinion of Jus-
tice Cardozo, in Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co.,100 a 1925 New
York case, illustrates this difficulty. In Connelly, an undertaker's
son developed blood poisoning when gangrene infection entered his
blood by a small cut while he was handling a gangrenous corpse.
Cardozo, writing for the court, said, "We attempt no scientifically
exact discrimination between accident and disease, or between dis-
ease and injury. None perhaps is possible, for the two concepts are
not always exclusive, the one of the other, but often overlap. 101
The Montana legislature, had it consulted with a few local
physicians in 1959, would have recognized that there is no essen-
tial, logical or consistent difference between disease and injury. In-
stead, the legislators, relying on their own preconceived notions of
disease, created a dual system of compensation. To an already il-
logical, inconsistent, unworkable definition of injury, they added
99. Dahl, Trends in Occupational Disease Compensation, 14 FORUM 467 (1979); Wil-
son, Workers' Compensation, Redefinition of Occupational Disease and the Applicable
Statute, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 288 (1980); Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational
Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1980).
100. 240 N.Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366 (1925).
101. Id. at 85, 147 N.E. at 367.
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more complications. Understandably, the term "occupational dis-
ease" was broadly defined in the Occupational Disease Act. Occu-
pational disease "means all diseases arising out of or contracted
from and in the course of employment. '"102 Probably, the legisla-
ture intended to give the courts and the Industrial Accident
Board ' room for interpretation, but the legislature was also pro-
ceeding on the false assumption that there is a definable and logi-
cal difference between disease and injury and that the courts and
the Industrial Accident Board knew the difference.
It was inevitable that reality would catch up with the legisla-
ture's mistake. In fact, the Montana Supreme Court was having
definitional problems even before the Occupational Disease Act
went into effect. In Hines v. Industrial Accident Board,1°4 decided
on the basis of law in effect prior to the Occupational Disease Act,
the court held that poliomyelitis contracted by a street worker ex-
posed to unsanitary working conditions constituted an injury. Jus-
tices Castles and Harrison dissented, asserting that poliomyelitis
was a disease. 0 5 The latest case that demonstrated this confusion
is Hoehne v. Granite Lumber Co.,'0 6 discussed earlier in this com-
ment. In Hoehne, four justices held that bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome, a disease of the hand caused by continued flexion of the
hand muscles, was an injury. Justice Sheehy dissented and main-
tained that it was a disease.10 7 The problem will soon surface again
unless the two definitions are consolidated.
Not all legislators, judges or lawyers have exactly the same
preconceived notion of disease. However, whatever preconceived
notion an individual may rely upon, that notion is almost always
based upon one or more of the following assumptions: (1) that a
disease is caused by a repeated or gradual exposure, (2) that a dis-
ease is manifested over a period of time, (3) that a disease is
caused by a chemical, bacterial, or viral agent as opposed to a
physical agent such as a heavy weight or a sharp object, (4) that a
disease is expected but that an injury is unexpected, or (5) that
proof of work-relatedness is different for a disease than it is for an
injury. As will be seen, all of these assumptions are false, and if
they are followed they lead to absurd results and inconsistent, il-
102. MCA § 39-72-102(11) (1981).
103. The Industrial Accident Board was the forerunner of the Workers' Compensation
Board.
104. 138 Mont. 588, 358 P.2d 447 (1960).
105. Id. at 598, 358 P.2d at 452.
106. - Mont. - , 615 P.2d 863 (1980).
107. Id. at __, 615 P.2d at 866. Accord, Collins v. Neevel Luggage Manufacturing
Co., 481 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome held an injury).
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logical case law. The first assumption, being the one most relied
upon, is discussed at greater length than the other assumptions.
Assumption 1: A Disease is Caused by a Repeated or Gradual
Exposure.
This assumption, which could be labeled the "extended expo-
sure rule," was well expressed in Summer v. Victor Chemical
Works,'" s a federal decision interpreting Montana law. In that
case, the court held that a claimant who had received multiple ex-
posures to phosphorus fumes had suffered an occupational disease.
Relying upon the extended exposure rule, the court held:
Though poisoning can be a gradual process (when it would not
have been deemed an accident within some workmen's compensa-
tion acts) it can also be a sudden and complete impregnation
(when the incident may also constitute an accident within most
workmen's compensation acts). 1"9
There are three reasons why the extended exposure rule will
not suffice in Montana to distinguish between disease and injury.
The first reason is that many bodily ailments, which any man-on-
the-street would call a disease if he saw the victim in a hospital
bed, are caused from a single exposure or at least have some defi-
nite, ascertainable beginning. If the extended exposure rule were
followed consistently, any disease that had a definite point of be-
ginning would have to be called an injury regardless of its subse-
quent or continued effects. In the Cardozo case, Connelly v. Hunt
Furniture Co.,110 the blood poisoning contracted by the single ex-
posure to gangrenous tissue would have to be classified as an in-
jury. In fact, most infectious diseases would have to be classified as
an injury simply because they are contracted from a single expo-
sure. A traveling employee who contracts malaria from a mosquito
bite would have an injury."1 A hospital worker who contracts hep-
atitis from an infected blood sample would have an injury.11
(Those states that see through the fallacy of the extended exposure
rule classify hepatitis as an occupational disease.) 1 A delivery
man who is bitten by a rabid dog and dies six months later would
108. 298 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1961).
109. Id. at 67-68.
110. 240 N.Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366 (1925).
111. Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills, Inc., 288 N.Y. 377, 43 N.E.2d 450 (1942).
112. CF & I Engineers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, - Colo. App. -, 520 P.2d
1048 (1974); Geist v. Martin Decker Corp., 313 So.2d 1 (La. 1975); Enid State School v.
Mitchell, 590 P.2d 1179 (Okla. 1978).
113. Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).-
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have an injury. " A woman who dies from tetanus 25 days after
cutting herself on some machinery would have an injury.1"' An em-
ployee who accidently spills a carcinogenic chemical on open tissue
and subsequently develops cancer would have an injury."'6 Cancer
caused by a single traumatic blow from a physical agent would be
an injury.' 17
The extended exposure rule, if followed consistently, can lead
to absurdities. In Montana, a psychological problem that develops
as the aftermath of a classical injury must be compensated as an
injury.1 8 In Berger v. Hahner, Foreman & Cate, Inc.,"' a Kansas
case wherein neurosis followed a physical injury, the court held
that, "when a primary injury . . . is shown to have arisen out of
course of employment every natural consequence that flows from
the injury, including a new and distant injury, is compensable if it
is a direct and natural result of a primary injury. '1 20 Pennsylvania
labeled this kind of rationale as the "unusual pathological result
doctrine" and applied it in Hatboro-Horsham School District v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board."'2 Therein, an em-
ployee knelt on cold cement for several hours. His right knee be-
came swollen and infected with staphylococcus. The infection
eventually spread throughout his entire body and aggravated pre-
existing medical problems. The man finally died of coronary and
liver failure. The court held that it was an injury.
A second reason that the extended exposure rule will not suf-
fice in Montana to distinguish between disease and injury is that
there is no consistent method for determining which exposures are
sudden and which are extended. Consider the following hypotheti-
cal situations: (1) Two men are exposed to subzero temperatures
for several hours. One gets frostbite; the other contracts pneumo-
nia. Has one suffered an injury, but the other a disease? (2) An
employee delivers first aid to a fellow worker for two hours in cold
weather. The employee later develops undefinable medical prob-
lems in his leg and it has to be amputated. Was the exposure sud-
den or extended? The Montana Supreme Court held that it was
114. The incubation period of rabies is 10 to 240 days. R. GRAY, ATTORNEY's TEXTBOOK
OF MEDICINE [hereinafter cited as GRAY] 40.27 (3d ed. Supp. 1981).
115. Okemah Publishing Co. v. Aaron, 285 P.2d 410 (Okla. 1955).
116. Hardy v. Southern Pacific Employees Ass'n, 10 Ariz. App. 464, 459 P.2d 743
(1969).
117. GRAY, supra note 114, at 72.11.
118. Sykes v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont. 239, 21 P.2d 732 (1933).
119. 211 Kan. 541, 506 P.2d 1175 (1973).
120. Id. at 545, 506 P.2d at 1179.
121. 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 73, 384 A.2d 1050 (1978).
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sudden enough to call this bodily harm an injury,12 2 (3) A miner,
trapped in a mine disaster, inhales smoke and gas for 40 hours.
Was the exposure sudden or extended?12 1 (4) A painter inhales
paint mist containing a toxic chemical for three hours. Was the
exposure sudden or extended? 2 " (5) An asphalt worker who suffers
a sunstroke after working all afternoon in the hot summer sun dies
11 days later. Was the exposure sudden or extended? 2 5 (6) Two
men who work in the same industrial plant contract the same in-
fectious disease. Neither man received any exposure to the disease
outside of his employment. One of them knows exactly when and
where he was exposed. The other knows only that he has the
symptoms. Has this second man suffered a disease instead of an
injury simply because he cannot prove when he contracted the
disease?
A third reason that the extended exposure rule fails is that the
Montana Supreme Court has classified many extended exposure
cases as injury cases. In Hoehne, 26 the claimant was exposed to
continued flexion of the hand muscles for over two months. The
court said that he had an injury. In Love v. Ralph's Food Store,"7
the court held that the claimant had suffered an injury where she
had been lifting heavy objects over a period of several weeks. Also
suffering injuries was the miner trapped in the smoke-filled mine
for 40 hours, 2 ' and the man who contracted poliomyelitis from
continued exposure to unsanitary working conditions.12 9
Assumption 2: A Disease Manifests Itself Slowly.
Not all diseases manifest themselves slowly. Tetanus, for in-
stance, may become evident within one day. 30 Allergies may show
up within minutes upon contact with a harmful source.' In
Greger v. United Prestress, Inc.,32 the claimant developed contact
dermatitis, an allergic reaction, while welding near cement. The
122. Young v. Liberty National Insurance Co., 138 Mont. 458, 357 P.2d 886 (1960).
123. Wirta v. North Butte Mining Co., 64 Mont. 279, 210 P.2d 332 (1922) (upheld
sudden exposure leading to injury).
124. Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (1939) (upheld sudden expo-
sure leading to injury).
125. Ryan v. Industrial Accident Board, 100 Mont. 143, 45 P.2d 775 (1935) (upheld
sudden exposure leading to injury).
126. - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 863 (1980).
127. 163 Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598 (1973).
128. Wirta v. North Butte Mining Co., 64 Mont. 279, 210 P.2d 332 (1922).
129. Hines v. Industrial Accident Board, 138 Mont. 588, 358 P.2d 447 (1960).
130. GRAY, supra note 114, 40.18.
131. GRAY, supra note 114, 1 65.12.
132. - Mont. - , 590 P.2d 1121 (1979).
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claimant did not file his claim for a few weeks, and when the case
finally reached the supreme court, the court held that he had an
occupational disease. If he would have filed his claim after the very
first day of welding, would he have had an injury? What consti-
tutes a lengthy manifestation period-a few hours, a few days or a
few years? These questions could be debated for years without
resolution.
Assumption 3: A Disease is Caused by Chemical or Biological
Agent.
Not all diseases are caused by chemical, bacterial or viral
agents. Some forms of cancer s3 and some forms of arthritis1 34 can
be caused by a single, physical, traumatic blow. Repetitive, physi-
cal micro-trauma accounts for several common ailments: tennis el-
bow in a tennis teacher, frozen shoulder syndrome in shelf stock-
ers," 5  housemaid's knee (pre-pateflar bursitis),136  arthritis," "
vibration disease in workers using compressed-air tools, 38 and of
course, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome." 9 Low temperatures can
make a person more susceptible to pneumonia.14 0 Prolonged expo-
sure to noise can lead to occupational deafness.1 4 1 A sudden change
in atmospheric pressure can cause the bends in miners and di-
vers.14 2 Mental stress can develop into physical or psychological
ailments.14 3 Exposure to electromagnetic waves such as x-rays,
gamma rays and ultra-violet rays,1" and exposure to ionizing radi-
ation1" can cause extremely serious diseases.14
133. GRAY, supra note 114, 1 72.11.
134. GRAY, supra note 114, 1 19F.00.
135. Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Industrial Comm'n, 24 Ariz. App.
427, 539 P.2d 541 (1975).
136. GPAY, supra note 114, 1 2.82(1).
137. GRaY, supra note 114, 19F.00.
138. GRAY, supra note 114, 1 3.80.
139. Hoehne v. Granite Lumber Co., - Mont. - , 615 P.2d 863 (1980).
140. GRAY, supra note 114,1 203.00. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Industrial Comm'n. 90 Ariz. 3,
363 P.2d 600 (1961).
141. Montana classifies occupational deafness as neither a disease nor an injury. MCA
§§ 39-71-801 through -813 (1981).
142. Taylor v. List & Weatherby Construction Co., Inc., 146 So. 353 (La. 1933).
143. In re Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 330 N.E.2d 603
(1975). See also, Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Compensability of Mental Injury,
21 N.Y. L.F. 465 (1976).
144. Dayton v. Boeing Co., 389 F. Supp. 433 (D. Mont. 1975). Judge Russell Smith
held that claimant who was exposed to laser radiation had suffered an occupational disease.
145. Ionizing radiation is the exposure to radioactive isotopes, such as radium, ura-
nium, thorium, actinium and polonium. This radiation, which is composed of alpha parti-
cles, beta particles and gamma rays, destroys tissue by stimulating cell activity beyond the
capacity of the cell. GRAY, supra note 114, 11 69.01-.21, 71.02.
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The assumption that diseases arise from chemical or biological
agents also fails because Montana law classifies many chemically or
bacterially caused diseases as injuries. Cardiovascular, pulmonary
and respiratory diseases, which are often caused by chemical, bac-
terial, or viral agents, are expressly included within the definition
of injury. 1 7 Moreover, the supreme court has construed the con-
cept of injury to include certain ailments caused by chemical or
biological agents." 8
Assumption 4: A Disease is Expected, but an Injury is
Unexpected.
This assumption does not withstand even a superficial cri-
tique. From a worker's standpoint, all diseases and injuries are
simply more or less predictable. A coal miner may expect to con-
tract black lung far more than he expects to break his leg, but this
alone should not give license to a legislature, court or administra-
tive body to label the black lung expected but the broken leg
unexpected.
The labels "expected" and "unexpected" are subjective. For
instance, a coal miner who contracts black lung in a mine where he
had a 50 percent chance of contracting this disease may label his
black lung "unexpected." On the other hand, another miner who
breaks his leg in a mine where he had a 50 percent chance of
breaking his leg may label his broken leg "expected." These labels
are devoid of any descriptive substance upon which to base a dis-
tinction between disease and injury. By themselves, the labels do
nothing to advance any solution to the occupational disease prob-
lem or the workers' compensation problem. As was clearly pointed
out earlier, focusing on such labels actually detracts from the real
question of work-relatedness. Legislators, judges and state admin-
istrators would do well to throw such terms out of their
vocabulary.
146. Radiodermatitis is one of the most common industrial diseases caused by expo-
sure to radioactive isotopes. GRAY, supra note 114, 71.01. See also McCormick v. United
Nuclear Corp., 87 N.M. 274, 532 P.2d 203 (1975) (lung cancer contracted by uranium mine
worker); Kress v. Newark, 8 N.J. 562, 86 A.2d 185 (1952) (skin cancer contracted by X-ray
technician); Besner v. Walter Kidde Nuclear Laboratory, 24 A.D.2d 1045, 265 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1965) (leukemia contracted by laboratory technician).
147. MCA § 39-71-119(2) (1981).
148. Wirta v. North Butte Mining Co., 64 Mont. 279, 210 P.2d 332 (1922) (miner
trapped in smoke-filled mine for 40 hours).
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Assumption 5: Proof of Work-relatedness is Different for Disease
than it is for Injury.
The core requirement of both an occupational disease claim
and an injury claim is proof of work-relatedness. For an occupa-
tional disease, the statutory requirements of work-relatedness, con-
tained in Montana Code Annotated [hereinafter cited as MCA] §
39-72-408 (1981), are met only if:
(1) there is a direct causal connection between the conditions
under which the work is performed and the occupational disease;
(2) the disease can be seen to have followed as a natural incident
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature
of the employment;
(3) the disease can be fairly traced to the employment as the
proximate cause;
(4) the disease does not come from a hazard to which workmen
would have been equally exposed outside of the employment;
(5) the disease is incidental to the character of the business and
not independent of the relation of employer and employee.
Montana attorneys have tended to shy away from using the
Occupational Disease Act on the presupposition that proving work-
relatedness for a disease is inherently more difficult than proving
work-relatedness for an injury. When a claimant has had a bodily
ailment that is not readily classified as a disease or an injury, the
claim is usually brought under the injury statutes. This is unneces-
sary. If work-relatedness cannot be proven under the occupational
disease statutes, then work-relatedness cannot be proven under the
injury statutes either.
The essential elements of work-relatedness for an occupational
disease claim are the same as the essential elements of work-relat-
edness for an injury claim. Subsection (1) of MCA § 39-72-408
(1981) is a cause-in-fact test. The same cause-in-fact test is ex-
pressed in the requirements for a compensable injury. The last
four subsections of MCA § 39-72-408 (1981) can be summarized as
a requirement that the disease be reasonably peculiar to the em-
ployment environment.149 This requirement is not a true cause test
but serves more as a statement of social policy to limit the number
and kind of occupational disease claims. Just as there is, in the
injury statutes, a social policy at work to prevent every employee
who shows up with an injury during working hours from being
compensated, there is also the same social policy at work in the
occupational disease compensation system to prevent employees
149. Greger v. United Prestress, Inc., - Mont. -, 590 P.2d 1121 (1979).
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from receiving compensation for the common cold. And just as
there is a lingering requirement of unexpectedness in the injury
statutes, so also is there a lingering requirement of unexpectedness
in the disease statutes. A disease which is peculiar to the work en-
vironment is "unexpected" but for the employment. Proving work-
relatedness for an occupational disease is the same as proving
work-relatedness for an injury.150
As demonstrated, preconceived notions of what a disease is
and what a disease is not do not bear any relationship to estab-
lished medical facts, nor are these preconceived notions supported
by any supposed difference in the proofs of work-relatedness for
disease and injury. Except for the fact that partial disability is not
allowed for occupational disease in Montana,"' the two compensa-
tion systems are identical. As a first step toward improving the oc-
cupational disease compensation system and the workers' compen-
sation system, the definitions of disease and injury should be
consolidated.
C. The Occupational Disease Act Has Not Achieved Its
Intended Purpose.
The Montana Occupational Disease Act has failed workers for
two reasons. First, the burden of proving work-relatedness requires
more accuracy than medical science can supply. Second, the stat-
ute of limitations for filing an occupational disease claim begins to
run at a time that bears no rational relationship to the long latency
periods of many diseases, thus cutting off many meritorious claims
years before the claimant even discovers his disease.
1. Proof of Work-relatedness
As just explained, one of the elements of proving an occupa-
tional disease claim is that the disease must be reasonably peculiar
to the employment environment. Other states have imposed simi-
lar statutory and judicial requirements.515 Through the 1950s, how-
ever, courts often applied a more rigid standard-that the disease
be strictly peculiar to the employment environment. For example,
150. To some extent, there is a "tangible happening" requirement in occupational dis-
ease, whether it be inhaling noxious fumes, cutting a finger with an infected knife, or work-
ing in proximity to a co-employee who has an infectious disease.
151. MCA § 39-72-703 (1981). Persuasive arguments for this exception do not exist.
Other states do not make the exception. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4654.55 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 172.43(d) (Smith-Hurd 1980); N.Y. WORK. CoMP. § 15(6) (McKinney 1981).
152. See generally Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 916 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Victims].
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in Pattiani v. State Industrial Accident Commission,15 a sales-
man from California traveled to New York City which was epi-
demic with typhoid fever at the time. The salesman contracted ty-
phoid fever but was denied benefits on the basis that the disease
was common to life-in other words, he could have contracted ty-
phoid fever off the job as easily as on the job. Since that time, this
requirement has been relaxed, although more than just lip service
is still paid to it.1'"
Blending in with this peculiarity requirement is the more sim-
ple requirement that there be a "direct causal connection""' be-
tween the disease and the employment. This is the real hurdle. For
a great number of disease cases, a direct causal link simply cannot
be medically proven to the degree that the court requires.'" The
result is that few occupational disease claims are paid. To an ex-
tent this may be a desirable social goal; after all, the occupational
disease compensation system was not designed to be a social insur-
ance program. However, consideration must be given to those
workers with meritorious claims. The question then boils down to
this: at what point should the claimant be given the benefit of the
doubt?'
The burden of proof currently required of the claimant by the
Montana Supreme Court is that he prove his case by a reasonable
medical certainty. " The court will not accept as reasonable medi-
cal proof the testimony of a medical expert that a claimant's dis-
ease was possibly caused by his employment.' 5 Thus, distinguish-
ing between possible and probable causation is critical. Perhaps it
should not be, for medical experts may not mean the same thing
by "possible" as lawyers do.'60
153. 199 Cal. 596, 250 P. 864 (1926).
154. Greger v. United Prestress, Inc., - Mont. -, 590 P.2d 1121 (1979).
155. MCA § 39-72-408 (1981).
156. Benzene and xylene, for example, are suspected carcinogens, but little is known
about them. How would a claimant ever establish a causal link between these two com-
pounds and any disease?
157. See Victims, supra note 152.
158. Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 148 Mont. 13, 417 P.2d 95 (1966).
159. Id. at 19-20, 417 P.2d at 99.
160. The following cases explain this point:
Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 671, 238 S.W.2d 640 (1951): Testimony of the
cause of the claimant's lung cancer was at best of the "possible" variety. He was compen-
sated nevertheless because the court concluded that the defendants could not prove their
side of the case-sub silentio, a shift of the burden of proof.
McCallister v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 69 Cal. 2d 408, 71 Cal. Rptr.
697, 445 P.2d 313 (1968): The wife of a fireman received compensation where her husband
died of lung cancer. Decedent had been on the job for 32 years, but had also smoked a pack
of cigarettes per day. The court held that the smoke he had inhaled while on the job had
1982]
27
LaPlante and Opp: Workers’ Compensation
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1982
102 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
Because proving work-relatedness is so difficult in typical dis-
ease cases, the occupational disease compensation system, origi-
nally intended to be a non-adversarial process, has turned into a
great legal and medical battlefield. There are a few diseases inher-
ently associated with certain occupations, and for these, the link
between the illness and the workplace may be as clear as for a
classical injury. Most diseases, however, are not unique to the
workplace or often involve multiple causes. 6 ' The effects of carcin-
ogens found in the workplace, for example, are rarely medically
distinguishable from the effects of carcinogens found outside the
workplace.162 For cases like these, there will be at least one, and
usually several, expert witnesses. The result is that occupational
disease claims are six times more likely to be contested than work-
ers' compensation claims. 6 ' The average occupational disease
claimant waits one year to receive compensation, whereas an in-
jured claimant will usually wait only two months. 6 " Employers and
insurers with time and money to spare can force an out-of-work,
"reasonably probably" caused his death. "Given the present state of medical knowledge, we
cannot say whether it was the employment or the cigarettes which 'actually' caused the
disease; we can only recognize that both contributed substantially to the likelihood of his
contracting cancer."
Bolger v. Chris -Anderson Roofing Co., 112 N.J. Super. 383, 271 A.2d 451 (1970): A two-
packs-a-day smoker who was subjected to fumes of tar, pitch, asphalt and asbestos was
compensated despite ambiguous testimony by a medical expert. The expert testified that it
was "reasonable to assume" that the combination of all these deleterious materials "contrib-
uted" to plaintiff's cancer, but that it was "speculative" whether the man would have con-
tracted cancer had he not been smoking.
Smith v. Humbolt Dye Works, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 1041, 312 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1970): A dyer of
wool yarns contracted papillary tumors of the bladder, allegedly from 25 years of exposure
to known carcinogens in the dye. Two medical experts testified that there was no causal link
between the occupation and the disease. Two other medical experts testified that there was
a high correlation between exposure to these carcinogens and this particular disease.
Neither of the latter medical experts produced any statistics demonstrating this correlation,
although one did make references to their existence. Compensation was granted despite the
conflicting evidence. See also Musselwhite, Medical Causation Testimony in Texas: Possi-
bility Versus Probability, 23 Sw. L.J. 622 (1969).
161. This class of diseases includes those to which the workplace contributed and at
the same time other sources of the disease are present. For instance, an asbestos worker who
smokes cigarettes has eight times the risk of lung cancer compared to cigarette smokers of
the same age, but 92 times the risk of men who neither work with asbestos or smoke. Se-
likoff, Multiple Factor Interaction In Occupational Diseases, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 97.
162. Solomon, Workers' Compensation for Occupational Disease Victims: Federal
Standard and Threshold Problems, 41 ALB. L. REV. 195 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Solo-
mon]. See also Kutchins, The Most Exclusive Remedy is No Remedy at All: Worker's Com-
pensation Coverage for Occupational Diseases, 32 LAB. L.J. 212, April (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Kutchins].
163. Occupational Diseases, 1977: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the
Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1977) (statement of
Prof. Peter Barth).
164. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 95.
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out-of-patience employee into a settlement for less than his claim
is actually worth.1 65
The solution is either to improve the level of medical science
or legislatively lower the burden of proof. Since little can be done
about the former, the legislature, if it is willing to accept any pro-
posed solution at all, must accept the latter one. There are a few
alternatives available: (1) lower the burden of proof of work-relat-
edness for all diseases and injuries (assuming a consolidated sys-
tem); (2) lower the burden of proof of work-relatedness for a
schedule of certain disease and injuries; or (3) create rebuttable
presumptions of work-relatedness where statistical evidence will
support such a presumption.
The issue behind these alternatives is how much error should
be tolerated to facilitate recovery by deserving workers. If any of
the above alternatives are chosen, accuracy would not be lost; it
would only be shifted from not paying some who deserve to paying
some who do not deserve. One thing is certain: the legislature
should not do anything to encourage more contested cases.
An across-the-board lowering of the burden of proof is the
simplest and quickest way to make a change, if employers, insurers
and consumers are willing to pay for the new claims. This matter
of occupational disease is as much economical and political as it is
legal. 66 From a gleaning of Montana case law, it is apparent that
there has been a general fear on the part of the legislature, courts,
and Workers' Compensation Division that if the burden of proof
were lowered, occupational disease would turn into a general social
insurance program. There is no evidence from any source to sub-
stantiate this fear.
Employers and insurers have long complained that if the costs
of compensation or compensation insurance go any higher they will
be unable to pass on the cost to consumers and will go out of busi-
ness. 1 67 If this is so, they sh6uld produce supportive evidence. As
yet they have not. If the costs of broader compensation are passed
on in the cost of goods, consumers may not lose as much as one
might think. Currently, two of the major sources of income for
workers disabled from an occupational disease are consumer sup-
165. Id.
166. Prior to 1930 there was virtually no statutory coverage of occupational disease.
After 1930, in the wake of a mine tragedy in West Virginia involving silicosis and the antici-
pated hundreds of millions of dollars in negligence recoveries, six states swiftly extended
their workers' compensation coverage to include silicosis victims. Was the motivating force
behind this legislation protection for employees or protection for employers? See Solomon,
supra note 162.
167. Kutchins, supra note 162.
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ported social security and consumer supported welfare. Fifty-three
percent of these disabled workers receive social security benefits,
while 16 percent receive welfare. Occupational diseases are costing
the social security and welfare programs 2.2 billion dollars annu-
ally.1"8 If the occupational disease compensation system began pay-
ing claims that it was designed to pay, then diseased workers
would not have to look to social security and welfare, and the tax-
payer/consumer might even get a break in his taxes.
A schedule of certain diseases and injuries with a lowered bur-
den of proof could be used with some effectiveness. Even if the
legislature did not want to consolidate occupational disease with
workers' compensation, this alternative could be used to lower the
burden of proof of work-relatedness for a host of diseases which
have been studied accurately in terms of cause and effect. At least
part of the problem could be alleviated. One drawback to this al-
ternative, however, is that the employee who needs more benefit of
the doubt than anyone, the employee who has'a rare unstudied
disease, will not receive the legal boost he needs.
The other alternative is to use rebuttable presumptions cre-
ated either by the legislature or by the Workers' Compensation Di-
vision pursuant to legislative guidelines. Where statistical or other
types of data would support a work-disease connection, a presump-
tion of work-relatedness could be utilized in the absence of con-
trary proof.1 9 Courts have traditionally balked at such presump-
tions, insisting that each claimant prove his own case.17 If this
attitude persists, however, few occupational disease claimants will
ever receive compensation.
A proof-by-presumption system would greatly aid the claim-
ants but would cause innumerable headaches for the body creating
the presumptions and the body applying them. Two problems are
paramount. First, what degree of work-relatedness will suffice to
support a presumption? Second, how broadly or narrowly should
the presumptions be applied? For example, will a national study
showing that 70 percent of the workers in a given industry con-
tracted a certain disease support a presumption that, in a particu-
lar industrial plant in Montana, every worker contracting that dis-
ease has a work-related disease? There are other problems as well.
What procedure should be used to decide the particular statistical
168. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 95.
169. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REv. 916
(1980).
170. Tilevitz, Judicial Attitudes Toward Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer Causa-
tion, 3 COLUM. J. OF ENVT'L. L. 344 (1976).
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study to rely on? Can a company's own study be utilized? If the
legislature were to choose the proof-by-presumption alternative, it
would be best to let the Workers' Compensation Division draw up
the details.
2. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for occupational disease claims,
MCA § 39-72-403 (1981), prohibits any claim from being brought
more than "3 years after the last day upon which the claimant or
the deceased employee actually worked for the employer against
whom compensation is claimed." The unfairness of this statute is
easily demonstrated. If an employee comes in contact with a highly
carcinogenic compound on his last day of work, but the cancer
does not manifest itself for 10 years, the employee will have no
claim. The difficulty with this statute of limitations then, is not
how long it runs, but when it begins to run. Many occupational
diseases, especially cancer, have longer latency periods than this
statute of limitations will account for. For example, asbestosis, a
form of lung cancer, has a latency period of 10 to 25 years.' 1 Other
cancers have latency periods of up to 35 years.7'' Early diagnosis is
rarely possible in cancer cases except in terms of change in statisti-
cal risk.17 8 Since there are thousands of toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals now in commercial production and use, 74 which may
lead to a myriad of diseases, it is difficult to estimate how many
potential claimants in Montana have not even filed a claim because
of the statute of limitations. If the occupational disease compensa-
tion system is ever to achieve its purpose, this statute of limita-
tions will have to be changed.
The legislature has two good alternatives. One possibility is to
begin the running of the statute either on the date the employee
discovers his disease or should have by "reasonable man" stan-
dards, or on the date of disablement, whichever comes first.17 5 This
is a slight improvement over the current statute, although it still
171. 5B LAW. MED. CYCLOPEDIA § 38.46(h) (1980).
172. GRAY, supra note 114, 72.40. Some specific carcinogens and their latency periods
are: arsenic, 18 years; tar, 20-24 years; creosote oil, 25 years; mineral oil, 21-28 years; crude
paraffin oil, 15-18 years; solar radiation, 20-30 years; chromates, 15 years; aromatic amines,
11-15 years. 5B LAW. MED. CYCLOPEDIA § 38.46(h) (1980).
173. Forgotson, Liability for Long-Term Effects of Toxic Agents, 50 A.B.A. J. 142
(1964).
174. There are now 30,000 chemicals in commercial production: 16,000 have toxic com-
ponents, and 1,500 are suspected carcinogens. 13 A. FRANK, COURTROOM MED. § 16.00 (1981).
175. Peters, Occupational Carcinogenisis and Statutes of Limitation: Resolving Rele-
vant Policy Goals, 10 ENVr'L L. 113 (1979).
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does not give that much benefit to employees since diagnosis of
work-relatedness may not come until after years of continued
symptoms.
A better choice would be to begin the running of the statute
on the date the employee discovers, or reasonably could be ex-
pected to discover, the occupational nature of his disease. Profes-
sor Larson, a distinguished authority on occupational disease, fa-
vors this approach' 76 and courts from several states have utilized
it.1 7 This alternative accommodates all the rights that any em-
ployee, self-insured employer, or insurer can reasonably expect. In
an occupational disease situation, one reason that a statute of limi-
tations exists is to protect self-insured employers or insurers from
unnecessarily delayed liability. However, a delay in filing an occu-
pational disease claim where the disease has a long latency period
can hardly be labeled unnecessary. If it is necessary for the em-
ployee to wait for years to discover his disease, then it is not un-
necessary for employers or insurers to wait for years to discover
their liability. Of employees, employers and insurers, it is employ-
ers and insurers who should be on the alert for potential claims
since government regulation of toxic substances 178 would act as
some sort of notice to them of potential future liability.
D. Conclusion
Since there is no medically definable, logical or consistent dif-
ference between a disease and an injury, the occupational disease
compensation system and the workers' compensation system
should be consolidated. This change, of itself, may not bring com-
pensation to more claimants, but it will smooth over some of the
difficulties confronting claimants, attorneys, judges and state ad-
ministrators in using these compensation systems which were origi-
nally designed to be so simple that no attorneys would be needed.
The legislature should also lower the burden of proof of work-re-
latedness, at least for some diseases, to match the current level of
medical science. Claimants with genuinely meritorious claims
should not be required to prove the impossible. As a further mea-
176. 3 LARSON, supra note 1, § 78.00.
177. Arndt v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 56 Cal. App. 3d 139, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 250 (1976); Bucuk v. E.A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187, 139 A.2d 436
(1958); Templeton v. Pope & Talbot, Inc. 7 Or. App. 119, 490 P.2d 250 (1971); Scobbo v.
Workmens' Compensation Appeals Board, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 109, 348 A.2d 169 (1975). The
court held that the "exact identity of the disease causing any patient's disability is often
ascertained sometime after the onset of its symptoms."
178. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2601-29 (1981).
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sure, the statute of limitations for disease should be changed so
that it begins to run from the date the employee discovers the oc-
cupational nature of his disease. If industry is ever to bear the
blood of its workmen, then the Montana legislature will have to
realize that there is more to bodily injury and disease than meets
the eye.
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